Introduction-12

12. The whole of this content, as we light upon it in its immediacy in the will, is there only as a medley and multiplicity of impulses, each of which is merely ‘my desire’ but exists alongside other desires which are likewise all ‘mine’, and each of which is at the same time something universal and indeterminate, aimed at all kinds of objects and satiable in all kinds of ways. When, in this twofold indeterminacy, the will gives itself the form of individuality (see Paragraph 7), this constitutes the resolution of the will, and it is only in so far as it resolves that the will is an actual will at all.

To resolve on something is to cancel the state of indeterminacy in which one content is prima facie just as much of a possibility as any other. As an alternative to etwas beschliessen (to resolve on something) the German language also contains the expression sick entschliessen. This expresses the fact that the indeterminate character of the will itself, as itself neutral yet infinitely prolific, the original seed of all determinate existence, contains its determinations and aims within itself and simply brings them forth out of itself.

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7 Responses to “Introduction-12”

  1. arybudhi Says:

    It is clear now, that my desires, for instance, for ice cream and others in my mind is an immediate will, a natural will in a vast of my mind, which is itself indeterminate, prolific. And it is the seed of all determinate existence. Once my ‘I’ (individuality) actualize this impulse, desire, inclination for an ice cream instead of others, it immediately rationalizes my will in determining and aiming to the ice cream.

    After reading the rest of Hegel introduction above and below, I guessed I did not see any ‘twist’ with the rest of Hegel explanation (from §1-§ 20) on the nature of human free will (e.g. willing-thinking, form-content, universality–individuality). And it seems I am not interested to make comment anymore on Hegel explanations. However, I just wonder and curious with the nature of human will in Islamist point of view. So from the §13-§20 I will use the ‘logic’ of Islamist fundamentalism in this Hegel’s scheme of free will.

    Though Islamic tradition has various explanations on the philosophy of human selfhood and will (as in Sufism and Muslim philosophers tradition, whom many fundamentalist seen it as heretics/un-islamic), the Islamist fundamentalist solely believes in literal meaning-reading of Quran and Hadiths (compilation of prophets saying and deeds). Put it shortly, Islamic fundamentalist (known as Salafism or neo-wahabism) believes that whomever want to be and become a good muslim, he/she has to surrender his/her will to God’s Will (this is the literal meaning of ‘Islam’). What Hegel meant that human has a free-will is suspicious.
    Meaning, human free-will is the subject of suspicion, indeed human has many immediate wills as in Hegel’s scheme, but this natural will in Islamic fundamentalist scheme could be sprung from our human nafs in which (Notes: (pl. Anfus or Nufus) lexically means soul, the psyche, the ego, self, life, person, heart or mind. (Mu’jam, Kassis)) “…. in the Qur’an, Allah (s.w.t.) has described at least 3 main types of the Nafs. And these are in rank from the worse to better: Nafs al-Ammara Bissu’ (the Nafs that urges evil [tempted by Jins, satan, or evil] ), Nafs al-Lawwama (the Nafs that Blames) and Nafs al-Mutma`inna (the Nafs at Peace [guided by God’s will]). See http://www.livingislam.org/nafs.html”
    Since these three characters of our human mind-ego are always plays in our ‘rationality’ and mostly we are ‘unaware’ on how it works, the only way to prevent evil thinks is forging our will to the Will of God. Since no one knows how to know the will of God directly except the Prophet, therefore it is the God’s will, which is stated in the Quran and Hadiths as later codified in the form of Syariah law, is as the pristine embodiment of God’s will for Muslim codes of ethics and conducts (it has to be applied for all individuals and institutions).
    Total surrender to God’s will literally as is state in syariah-will prevents and guides Muslim in avoiding his/her wicked wills. Therefore, fulfilling God’s Will is the willing-thinking, form-content, universality–individuality of any Muslim’s consciousness and rationality. Thus, being rational and conscious human being is being in tune with the God’s Will or syariah.

  2. pinak sarkar Says:

    Will is the combination of all the multiple desires, which exists within the individual. therefore, will gives itself the form of individuality which in turn constitutes the resolution of will. the will itself is indeterminate, but it contains the seed of all determinant existence. when we take side to one of the impulses or desires then the will becomes determinate.

  3. Anu Says:

    Natural consciousness will show itself to be untrue knowledge. This is because lacking cognition of truth, science cannot reject other forms of knowledge as an ordinary way of looking at things; it cannot also promise us of something better to come. Doing the former, science will simply be declaring its power to be in its being which untrue knowledge also does. In doing the latter it is again of not much use because it is then appealing to “an inferior form of its being rather than what it is in and for itself” (Phenomenology of Spirit, Trans. A.V. Miller. Introduction, p. 49). However, in natural consciousness taking itself to be real knowledge (which is not), what happens is that it loses its own self. The pathway thus maybe termed as one of doubt and despair. However the doubt and despair does not occur in the ordinary sense of the term. Here the path becomes the “conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge”(Phenomenology of Spirit, Trans. A.V. Miller. Introduction, p. 50). Thus consciousness goes through a series of resolves on this road, all of which constitute the history of the education of consciousness on its path to becoming Science. Thus “the way of the Soul is the actual fulfillment of the resolution(Phenomenology of Spirit, Trans. A.V. Miller. Introduction, p. 50)”.

  4. P Says:

    The transformation of the will that is natural and immediate, to the realm of the actual is through resolution. Resolution involves a negation of the indeterminacy; and the will gives itself individuality. It is the presencing ( wissen) of the will.
    The significance of ‘will’ and its ‘achievement of freedom’ can be recognized as Hegel’s response to liberalism; the critique of liberalism is one relevant project of Hegel’s political philosophy. Liberal democracy was a late 19th century development which contended that the chief purpose of the state is to protect liberty, the rights of the citizens to pursue happiness in their own manner; freedom consisting in the absence of coercion and constraint.(Beiser 2008, 228). In the Philosophy of rights, Hegel’s attempt is also to synthesize liberalism with communitarianism. Rights, are self resolved freedom of will, with which the individuals identify with the state and regard themselves as part of the community. He took exception to liberalism in fundamental ways. He questioned the classical economic doctrine that the free workings of market forces naturally work out for the benefit of everyone alike. He contented that the only way to ensure the liberties of civil society was for the Government to control market forces. Let me engage with the UID project against this background.
    A similar aporia of liberalism can be found in Foucault. His argument is that neo liberal governments function not to ensure equality or eliminate poverty but to enhance economic growth by zero market intervention such that all individuals achieve a level of income that will allow them the individual insurance, access to private property, and individual or familial capitalization with which to absorb risks. ( Foucault 2004, 144). The role of the government is that of a facilitator for the regulation of society by market. It intervenes on the society so that the competitive mechanisms of market economy can play a regulatory role at every moment and point in the society. ( Foucault 2004, 145). The consequences of the liberal art of government are that, a) market, competition and enterprise will be established as the formative powers of the society and b) it results in subsequent changes in the systems of law and judicial institutions as multiplication of enterprises multiply opportunities for disputes. Against this backdrop it is interesting to note that market actors have been taking avid interest in the new possibilities offered by the UID. Credit card issuers, home loan providers, petty money lenders are all eager to carry out background checks of their clients. Global heads of major IT companies from Microsoft chairman Bill Gates, Yahoo CEO Carol Bartz, Intel chairman Paul Ottelini, to John Kendell, the national security program director for Unisys, the security solution provider for FBI have expressed interest in building technology for the project. The stocks of Hyderabad based Bartronics (a magnetic card manufacture) surged by 9.26% on the day the government announced the constitution of the authority. (Maringanti 2009, 37). Expanding domestic market is a possible path towards achieving high rate of growth. With the UID, the poor will indeed emerge as potential target markets. The UID marks an evident shift to consumer citizenship dominantly defined by debt legibility, the acts of consumption and debt made biometrically visible and the state takes up the role of tagging, monitoring and continually creating populations as data sets.( Shukla 2010, 31). It is quite apparent that with the UID, the government is not in any ways aiming to control the market forces, but multiply enterprises for market forces to play through its biometrically tagged new generation citizens who leave digital footprints where ever they go.

    Beiser, Frederick. 2008 Hegel. New York: Routledge
    Foucault, Michel.2004 The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France 1978- 1979. London: Palgrave Macmillan
    Mariganti, Anant. 2009. Sovereign State and Mobile Subjects: Politics of the UIDAI. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol XLIV No.46: 35-40
    Shukla, Ravi. 2010. Reimagining Citizenship: Debating India’s Unique Identification Scheme. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol XLV No.2: 31-36

  5. Nalini Says:

    The will gives itself the form of individuality. This constitutes the resolution of the will. The will is a will only if it resolves. The will contains the seed of indeterminacy and has the capacity ot resolve.

  6. zubin Says:

    [Response to 11-12-13-14]

    Hegel here is setting up the will to become one that moves from the particular to the universal. Without this movement, Hegel would not be able to eventually conclude that the state represents the highest individuation of the will, which is what he sets out to do in this entire dialectical exercise.

    The impulses and desires, which are implicitly free, and provide the individual will with an immediacy a content that one can call it’s own and different from others. These are “determined in the course of nature” according to Hegel and form the content of the will. However, this will remains finite and bound to the individual. Although the will in such an instance is “implicitly rational” to the individual or existing for him/her, it still lacks the “form of rationality.” Hegel is careful to delineate this ‘form’, which clearly has to be more than finite, from the ‘content’ discussed above. It is this ‘resolving’ which confirms to the will itself that it has a particularity.

    Notice how there is a shift here in Hegel’s argument where he speaks of the will first as coming forth from the individual to giving the will it’s own substance and agency where in it can both ‘posit itself’ and begins to ‘stand over’ this content. By this move, Hegel has actualised the universal will, one which sublates, via a dialectical process, the initial individual will. So here, the process completes and it is not hard to guess that Hegel would confer that the universal will has it’s own substance; the very substance that gives it its legitimacy and raison d’etre. Yet, he does not do away with the individual will either, locking it in a dialectic because it is always ‘tied to its content’. This too, he adds, is not now any particular will of a particular individual (“it is not tied to this or that specific content”), but a range of possibilities, ie. an abstraction.

  7. Udayakumar Says:

    This entry illustrates one of the powerful sides of Hegelian dialectics and it has been creatively appropriated by thinkers like Jacques Laccan who elaborated the notion of desire as the will’s fundamental urge to stabilise its indeterminate relationship with the world. As long as it remains unstable, ‘I’ undergoes degeneration, therefore it inherently urges to overcome this degeneration. It is this urge to overcome this degeneration is called desire.

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