Introduction-11

11. The will which is but implicitly free is the immediate or natural will. The specific characteristics of the difference which the self-determining concept sets up within the will appear in the natural will as an immediately existing content, i.e. as the impulses, desires, inclinations, whereby the will finds itself determined in the course of nature. This content, together with the specific differences developed within it, arises from the rationality of the will and so is implicitly rational; but, poured out in this way into the mould of immediacy, it still lacks the form of rationality. It is true that this content has for me the general character of being mine; but this form is still different from the content, and hence the will is still a will finite in character.

Empirical psychology details and describes these impulses and inclinations, and the needs arising from them, as it finds them, or presumes it finds them, in experience, and it proceeds in the usual way to classify this given material. Consideration is given below to the objective element in these impulses, both to its true character stripped of the form of irrationality which it possesses as impulse and also to the manner in which at the same time it is shaped externally.

Advertisements

6 Responses to “Introduction-11”

  1. arybudhi Says:

    Indeed, the impulses, desires, inclinations or the immediate are natural will which are still free but already had its immediate self-determined concept from the rationality of our will. That is why implicitly rational, but since it is still as an impulse, desire, or inclination therefore it is lack of our rationality though the content of this will could have the character as mine (i.e. my desire, my impulse, or my inclination). However, it is probably not ‘my’ even though it is in me. In §12 we see that these drives, impulses, desires, or inclination is not one and single only, “each of which is merely ‘my desire’ but exists alongside other desires which are likewise all ‘mine’, and each of which is at the same time something universal and indeterminate, aimed at all kinds of objects and satiable in all kinds of ways.” Therefore, until once it is manifest in actual action to the external object then the will gives itself the form of individuality, mine!
    It is a state of full act of rationalization of the will, a resolution of the will.

  2. Anu Says:

    The concept sets up differences within the will, and the will in its natural manifestation consists of impulses, desires etc. Though the will and its content are implicitly rational, the differences that are present in it manifestation as the natural will lacks the form of rationality. Thus it is only implicitly rational and hence is finite in character. We read a mode of accounting for the imperfections found in the world, the less-than-ideal conditions, in this articulation of Hegel’s. However the mode in which to approach Hegel may not be to locate which articulations of his sound desirable to us and to then locate the possibility of the same in one’s own project, or to identify the parts that resonate with one’s own inclinations for enquiry. For example, if Hegel is central to an articulation on the Will that the State is conceptually the ultimate realization of, the useful question to ask is what is the nature of the task that Hegel undertakes? What are the conceptual and empirical boundaries from within which Hegel sets out to answer his question? In Hegel’s scheme of things the intention is to arrive at a ‘cognition of truth’ through a scientific study. Truth and falsity are irrelevant antithesis, and the diversity of philosophical systems is a progressive unfolding of the truth. The task of philosophy is to cognize the truth; to engage in study that engages with the old or new without conception of the whole, or gets engrossed in the disagreements between various philosophical systems are all missing the point. What is required is “getting acquainted with general principles and points of view so as to first work up to a general conception of the real issue as well as to support and refute the general conception with reasons”, then and only then, to “apprehend the rich and concrete abundance (of life) by differential classification; and finally to give accurate instruction and pass serious judgement upon it” (Phenomenology of spirit, p.3) Hegel thus sets out to raise philosophy to science by cognizing the true shape in which truth exists through a scientific system of such truth, following the specific methodology given above.

  3. P Says:

    In the Hegelian dialectic, the historical processes begins with the mind. Hegel opposed conceiving of human beings solely in individualistic terms, as Hobbes and Locke attempted to do. Hegel the idealist, was interested in establishing for political life an ethical basis that would be beyond the utilitarian individualism of the social contract theory. (Knuttilla and Wendee Kubik 2000, 86). For Hegel, the belonging to a community was a conscious act, and such a belonging facilitates the ‘ absolute ethical life’, which means that the membership to the community is absolute, as opposed to a means to an end determined by self interest ( utilitarian individualism). It is an analyzes of the principles and institutions governing rational social life, which includes family, civil society and the state. He viewed the whole process of the emergence of the civil society as a central aspect of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in western Europe.
    For Hegel, the unfolding of the universe, is the unfolding of spirit and rationality; the emergence of modern society and the state are aspects of this process. Hegel conceives the modern state through an understanding of the Absolute Spirit- ie, the world spirit or god. The absolute reveals itself to human consciousness in the course of its dialectical movement.
    Hegel analyzes the concept of will in this context. He analyzes the conditions required for will to achieve its freedom. The will that is free, is immediate or natural will. Hegel attributes a specific sense of spontaneity to natural will. It has to engage in actions voluntarily and impulsively. It is still in the realm of the rational, as it arises from the rational but it expresses itself in a surge of immediacy, which has not yet achieved the form of rationality. On Hegel’s analysis, the tendency of the will to be free is one of its fundamental characteristic (27).

  4. Nalini Says:

    It is interesting to note how the mould of immediacy changes the nature of the will. It starts lacking in rationality even though it is rational.

  5. zubin Says:

    11-12 responded to on 12’s page…

  6. Udayakumar Says:

    The will finds its determination in immediately existing contents such as impulses, desires and inclinations etc. However, the manifestations of the natural will lack rationality which it attains only when it enters into a relation between what is external to it. This is a dialectical relation.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: